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Dear Reader,
The Packard Foundation has a long history of investing in evaluation in support 
of effective, innovative solutions. When I joined Packard as Evaluation and 
Learning Director in early 2012, I spent a lot of time studying our deep and 
diverse experience base and was particularly struck by the use of evaluation in 
our children’s health insurance grantmaking. Since 2000, evaluation has been 
intentionally integrated into the children’s health insurance program strategy. 
Evaluation was far from an add-on to fulfill reporting requirements. It was an 
integral component of the work, contributing to better health outcomes for kids. 
The team had a great story to tell. Yet others within Packard—and beyond—
knew little about their work. The intent of this report is to tell the story of what 
we’ve learned about the strategic use of evaluation from our experiences in 
children’s health insurance, so others designing and executing on social change 
strategies can benefit.
At the Packard Foundation, our monitoring, evaluation, and learning efforts 
take many different forms, and no one case will capture all the dimensions of 
effective practice that we care about. The children’s health insurance story is 
not, for example, a story about learning from failure, nor is it an illustration of 
using evaluation results for continuous learning and program improvement (our 
experiences with home visitation and preschool for California’s children are 
instructive on these fronts). It is a story of embedding evaluation into a program 
strategy. It’s about excellent execution from beginning to end, with thoughtful 
stakeholder engagement, effective communication of findings, and smart 
adaptation as new challenges and opportunities emerged. I hope that by sharing 
these experiences, we can help evolve the practice of integrating evaluation into 
strategy design and implementation.
Diana Scearce
EVALUATION AND LEARNING DIREC TOR
The David and Lucile Packard Foundation
June 2014
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ABOUT THE DAVID 
AND LUCILE PACKARD 
FOUNDATION
The David and Lucile Packard 
Foundation is a private 
family foundation created 
in 1964 by David Packard 
(1912–1996), co-founder of 
the Hewlett-Packard Company, 
and Lucile Salter Packard 
(1914–1987). The Foundation 
provides grants to nonprofit 
organizations in the following 
program areas: Conservation 
and Science; Population and 
Reproductive Health; Children, 
Families, and Communities; 
and Local Grantmaking. The 
Foundation makes national 
and international grants and 
also has a special focus on the 
Northern California counties of 
San Benito, San Mateo, Santa 
Clara, Santa Cruz, and Monterey. 
Foundation grantmaking 
includes support for a wide 
variety of activities including 
direct services, research and 
policy development, and public 
information and education. Learn 
more at www.packard.org.
The David and Lucile Packard 
Foundation is a tax-exempt charitable 
organization qualified under section 
501(c)(3) and classified as a private 
foundation under section 509(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code. Packard 
Foundation funds may have been 
used to support some, but not all, of 
the activities of grantees and others 
described in this report. No Packard 
Foundation funds were used to 
support or oppose any candidate for 
election to public office. No Packard 
Foundation funds were “earmarked” 
or designated to be used for lobbying 
or “attempts to influence legislation” 
(as defined in section 4945(d)(1) of the 
Internal Revenue Code). 
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INTRODUCTION
Foundations support evaluations for a variety of reasons: To measure impact and monitor program 
performance; to strengthen program performance by providing formative feedback to grantees and 
foundation staff; and to promote broader learning by grantees, the foundation, and the nonprofit 
community at large. Foundations such as the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation have also used 
evaluations to leverage the impact of their programs. This leveraging strategy frequently follows a 
demonstration, evaluation, and dissemination path in which investments are made in independent 
evaluations of grant programs with the hope that positive evaluation findings will assist the federal 
government or other public and private funders in deciding whether to replicate the program models 
and take them to scale.
Along these lines, in the David and Lucile Packard 
Foundation’s grantmaking strategy to ensure that all 
children have health insurance, program evaluation has 
been used as a powerful strategic intervention in its own 
right. The Packard Foundation experience suggests that 
evaluation can be powerful when it is embedded in a 
broader change strategy that includes active networking, 
expert and accessible technical assistance, and effective 
communications. 
This report explores the Packard Foundation’s experience 
with program evaluation as a strategic intervention in its 
work on children’s health insurance and presents some 
of the principal lessons learned from that experience. The report also highlights the value of being 
opportunistic and adaptive to changing circumstances. The Packard Foundation experience suggests 
that to have a major impact on the issues that it cares about, a foundation has to be on the lookout 
for windows of opportunity to advance its agenda, and must be highly strategic in leveraging those 
opportunities if and when they occur.
The report was collaboratively written by Paul Jellinek, foundation consultant and former Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation executive, and Eugene Lewit, who led the Packard Foundation’s work on children’s 
health insurance during the period under review. The report is based on Lewit’s experience and on 
internal and published Packard Foundation documents, evaluation reports, newspaper accounts, and 
other written sources, as well as more than 20 interviews with past and current Packard Foundation 
staff, staff from other foundations, the lead evaluator of the Packard Foundation’s children’s health 
insurance work, state and local advocates, program administrators, and others (see Appendix 1 for a 
complete list of interviewees). Paul Jellinek conducted most of the interviews and document review. 
Evaluation can be powerful when 
it is embedded in a broader 
change strategy that includes 
active networking, expert and 
accessible technical assistance, 
and effective communications . 
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PART I:
California Dreaming:  
The Santa Clara Story 
Rigorous evaluation coupled with communications and technical 
expertise were used as part of grantmaking strategy that leveraged an 
innovative children’s health insurance program in Santa Clara County 
into a statewide effort to offer insurance to all children in California .
Subsequent  
years
•	 Two other attempts to create 
programs to cover all California 
children narrowly defeated
•	 CHIs remain active in a number  
of California counties today
2003
•	 CHIs developed in 
several other counties 
with support from 
foundations, local 
First 5 commissions, 
and other sources
2000
•	 A group of county 
leaders leverage 
tobacco settlement 
funds to develop the 
Santa Clara County 
Children’s Health 
Initiative (CHI)
2004
•	 Evaluation findings show that 
Santa Clara CHI boosts enrollment 
in state insurance programs, 
increasing state and federal funds 
to the county by $24.4M
•	 Packard Foundation and 
Mathematica actively 
disseminate evaluation findings
•	 First 5 California launches 
matching grants to help fund 
CHIs in all California counties
2002
•	 Other foundations join the Packard 
Foundation, the City of San José, Santa 
Clara County, and First 5 Santa Clara in 
providing premium support for the CHI
•	 Mathematica’s evaluation plan for the 
CHI funded
•	 The Packard Foundation convenes a 
CHI evaluation advisor group to help 
maximize impact of evaluation
•	 The Packard Foundation funds 
technical assistance center to help 
other counties replicate the CHI model
2001
•	 The Packard Foundation 
provides premium support 
to the Santa Clara CHI and 
develops the “tipping point” 
strategy to use evaluation, 
communications, and technical 
assistance to spread the CHI 
model to other counties and 
eventually statewide 
2005
•	 Evaluation findings show that Healthy Kids 
program significantly increases children’s access 
to medical and dental care
•	 CHIs in operation in 18 counties and 10 more  
in development
•	 Healthy Kids enrollment grows to more than 
80,000 children
•	 California governor vetoes legislation to insure 
all California children
DO YOU KNOW THE WAY… ?
It all started with Bob Brownstein, a New York City native who has lived in California’s Silicon Valley for 
more than 30 years but still sounds like he’s just stepped out of the Bronx. Back in 1996, when he was 
budget and policy director for the City of San José, Brownstein, together with the city attorney, spotted 
an opportunity to bring new revenues into the city’s coffers by becoming one of only three California 
cities to join with 16 states (not yet including California) in a major lawsuit against Big Tobacco. 
Three years later, in 1999, Brownstein had left city government to become 
the director for policy and research at a local labor organization called 
Working Partnerships USA, but he hadn’t forgotten about that big 
lawsuit. Just a few months earlier, the tobacco companies had agreed to 
a gargantuan financial settlement with what by that time had become 46 
states (including California) and four California cities, and it looked like the 
City of San José was going to get about $10 million a year out of the deal.1 
And so Brownstein—who was always on the lookout for an opportunity 
to help those on the lower rungs of the economic ladder—started to think 
hard about how this sudden windfall could be put to use to help the many 
families in San José who were not in a position to benefit from the dot-
com boom.
After considering a range of options, Brownstein concluded that the best use of the new money would 
be to provide health insurance for the city’s uninsured children. He knew that a lot of children from 
San José’s low- and moderate-income families were already eligible for either Medi-Cal (California’s 
Medicaid program) or Healthy Families (California’s version of CHIP 2), but he also knew that even 
families with incomes too high to qualify for Healthy Families often had trouble finding affordable 
health insurance for their children. And Brownstein knew that there were a lot of uninsured children 
in San José who weren’t eligible for any public health insurance program because they were 
undocumented immigrants. The more he thought about it, the more excited he became. What if San 
José could become the first city in the country to ensure that all its children had coverage?
Over the course of the next year, Brownstein worked closely with a small group of local partners to make 
this vision a reality, including Matt Hammer, a community activist who led a grassroots organization 
of local congregations called People Acting in Community Together (PACT); Bob Sillen, the politically 
astute head of the county’s health and hospital system; and Leona Butler, a health policy expert who ran 
the Santa Clara Family Health Plan, the nonprofit HMO that had been established by the county a few 
years earlier to provide coverage for residents eligible for Medi-Cal or Healthy Families. Together, they 
expanded the scope of Brownstein’s original vision to include all of Santa Clara County and secured 
multiyear funding from the tobacco settlement allocations awarded to both the county and the city, 
as well as from Santa Clara County’s First 5 Commission, which had been established under a recently 
enacted state initiative that had raised tobacco taxes to fund services for children through age 5. With 
substantial local funding secured, they created the Children’s Health Initiative, which in January 2001 
started signing up the first of Santa Clara County’s tens of thousands of uninsured children—including, 
for the first time, large numbers of undocumented children.
1  Payments under the Multistate Settlement Agreement are made in perpetuity but subject to a number of adjustments. As a result of the 
interplay of these adjustments, annual payments have fluctuated from year to year and will likely decline over time as cigarette sales by the 
participating manufacturers decline. 
2  The Children’s Health Insurance Program, which is jointly funded by the federal government and the states, and covers children from families 
with incomes too high to qualify for Medicaid but less than two-and-a-half times the Federal Poverty Level.
Brownstein concluded 
that the best use of 
the new money would 
be to provide health 
insurance for the city’s 
uninsured children .
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3The Santa Clara County Children’s Health Initiative built on Medi-Cal and Healthy Families, the two 
public insurance programs that already provided coverage for children with family incomes up to two-
and-a-half times the Federal Poverty Level. To these programs, the Children’s Health Initiative added 
two critical components: 
1 A new insurance program (Healthy Kids) that would cover all Santa Clara County children—
including undocumented children—with family incomes up to three times the Federal Poverty 
Level who were ineligible for Medi-Cal or Healthy Families.
2 A single, very simple intake process for all three programs that would include an intensive 
community-based outreach effort to encourage families to enroll their children.
This intake process, now known as “no wrong door,” was especially important. In addition to getting 
eligible children into Healthy Kids, it was expected to result in the enrollment of large numbers of 
children who were in fact eligible for Medi-Cal or Healthy 
Families but were not enrolled—producing a substantial 
“welcome mat” or “multiplier” effect.3 This in turn would 
yield two additional benefits: First, because there were more 
uninsured children eligible for Medi-Cal and Healthy Families 
than for Healthy Kids, enrolling those children was necessary 
to reach the goal of covering all children living in Santa Clara 
County. And second, because Medi-Cal and Healthy Families 
were jointly funded by the state and the federal government, 
the Children’s Health Initiative could potentially bring a 
lot of new dollars into the county to cover children and 
thereby reduce the burden on local government of caring 
for uninsured children—a feature that soon became a major 
selling point with local political leaders, both in Santa Clara 
County and elsewhere.
ENTER THE PACKARD FOUNDATION
There was, however, one very big catch to this exciting new Children’s Health Initiative—one that 
Brownstein and his partners had recognized from the outset: In order to be affordable to many of the 
families whose children were eligible, the premiums for the Healthy Kids insurance program would 
have to be heavily subsidized. And while the money raised from the county, the city, and the First 5 
Commission was certainly a good start, they knew from estimates of the large number of uninsured 
children in Santa Clara County that it wasn’t going to be enough. And so, early on, they started talking 
about additional funding with several private foundations, including the David and Lucile Packard 
Foundation, which was located right in Santa Clara County and was one of the largest foundations in 
the country.
3  An important corollary to this benefit was that the Children’s Health Initiative provided an umbrella of coverage to all children in “mixed 
status” families (families with both documented and undocumented children).
The Children’s Health Initiative 
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government of caring for 
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4The Packard Foundation was already very active in the area of 
children’s coverage locally, in California, and at the national level,4 
and the Foundation’s staff—including Linda Baker, the program 
officer who was working on children’s coverage in the Foundation’s 
local area, and her boss, Gene Lewit, who directed the children’s 
health insurance program at the Foundation—had been aware of 
what was going on in their own back yard for some time. When 
Brownstein and his partners met with Lewit and Baker, they 
asked for a large grant to help with the premium subsidies that 
would be needed. “They had a one-page proposal that laid out 
the model,” Lewit recalls, “and they said, ‘We’ll have $6 million or 
$8 million but we’re going to need a lot more than that.’”
Lewit and Baker were sympathetic 
but reluctant. They had turned down 
requests for premium support in the 
past, knowing all too well that once 
a foundation started down that road, 
it could be very hard to turn back—
and that although such grants can 
benefit large numbers of children, 
premium support by itself does little 
to advance the agenda of coverage 
for all children. Instead, the Packard 
Foundation made a grant at the end 
of 2000 to the new Santa Clara Family 
Health Foundation to help with the 
further development of the Children’s 
Health Initiative, and to hire professional staff to help them raise 
money from individual donors and the many rapidly growing 
companies in the Silicon Valley. The Packard Foundation also 
funded the Institute for Health Policy Solutions to provide policy 
and technical assistance to the Children’s Health Initiative under the 
direction of Liane Wong, an experienced health policy consultant 
who had expertise in coverage expansion and financing, and who 
knew all the Santa Clara County players.
Following the launch of the Children’s Health Initiative in early 
2001, enrollment in Healthy Kids grew rapidly, and Brownstein 
and his partners came back to the Packard Foundation and once 
again pressed their case for direct premium support, knowing that 
the other potential funders would likely take their cue from the 
Packard Foundation. 
4  The Packard Foundation had been supporting various efforts in California to enroll eligible 
children in Medi-Cal and Healthy Families, including earlier efforts in Santa Clara County. But 
the Foundation’s main focus had been at the national level, with grants to Washington, D.C.-
based organizations like the National Governors Association, the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, the National Academy for State Health Policy, the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, the National Immigration Law Center, and Families USA—all to work on children’s 
coverage issues. And in 1999, the Foundation had partnered with the federal government in 
funding a national research program—the Child Health Insurance Research Initiative—to look 
at the impact of CHIP.
The key would be to 
rigorously evaluate 
whether the Children’s 
Health Initiative model 
succeeded in enrolling 
large numbers of 
uninsured children .
TOBACCO AND 
CHILDREN’S HEALTH 
COVERAGE
In one of those strange quirks 
of fate that sometimes occur in 
real life, it was Lewit who, almost 
20 years earlier, had been the 
lead author of a landmark report 
published by the National Bureau 
of Economic Research that had 
first documented the fact that 
increases in tobacco taxes led 
to a sharp reduction in teenage 
smoking—a much bigger 
reduction than for adults. And it 
was the findings from this report, 
later reported in a prominent 
article in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association, 
that had been used to make the 
case for subsequent increases 
in state and federal tobacco 
taxes. As a result, in addition to 
saving many thousands of lives 
through the reductions that 
occurred in smoking, tobacco 
taxes became the largest 
funding source for subsequent 
expansions in children’s coverage, 
including the initial federal 
funding for CHIP and California’s 
Proposition 10, which funds 
all the First 5 commissions. 
This experience also 
demonstrated the power of 
research to influence policy and 
bring about large-scale systems 
change. Lewit saw for himself 
how, through skillful advocacy 
and aggressive dissemination, the 
seemingly arcane research that 
he and his colleagues had done 
on the impact of tobacco taxes 
on teenage smoking had been 
parlayed into policy changes, at 
both the state and federal levels, 
that completely transformed 
the battle against youth 
smoking and also funded CHIP.
5A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
As he listened to Brownstein and his partners, it began to dawn on Lewit that this ambitious new 
model might not only cover all of the children in Santa Clara County but could also be one of those 
rare opportunities to bring about real systems change in Santa Clara County and—if proven to work 
well—in other California counties, at the state level, and maybe even at the national level. 
Susan Packard Orr, the daughter of David and Lucile Packard and Foundation Board chairperson, had 
on several occasions mentioned the idea of funding an innovative local program that could become 
a model for statewide and even national replication. Possibly, the staff thought, this new Children’s 
Health Initiative was such a model. Carol Larson, at that time the Packard Foundation’s vice president 
and today its president and CEO, recalls that she saw it that way. “We cared about using Santa Clara as 
a model,” she says, “and we had local leadership that cared about doing something for kids. At the very 
least, a lot of kids would be helped, but hopefully the program could also serve as a model to bring 
about change.”
The key would be to rigorously evaluate whether the Children’s Health Initiative model succeeded in 
enrolling large numbers of uninsured children and also improved the health of children who had not 
previously had access to coverage. If the Children’s Health Initiative model was proven to have achieved 
both desired outcomes, the evaluation findings could be used to help spread the model to enough 
other counties to create a “tipping point” for a similar state program. And so the staff developed a 
three-part strategy for promulgating the Children’s Health Initiative model that included:
1 Funding the local program and making sure that it was successfully implemented.
2 Rigorously evaluating the program so that the findings would be compelling to the people 
who needed to be convinced of its success—and would address the issues of greatest concern 
to them in real time.
3 Implementing an aggressive communications and dissemination strategy, coupled with a first-
rate technical assistance center, so that word could be spread quickly about the evidence of 
the model’s effects, followed by hands-on technical assistance and expertise to help those who 
were interested in establishing their own Children’s Health Initiatives. 
In order to meet the first condition, the staff knew that the Packard Foundation—together with other 
California foundations—would in fact have to provide the additional premium support that Brownstein 
and his partners were requesting. Otherwise, not enough families would be able to enroll to meet the 
program’s goals. Accordingly, in December 2001, the Packard Foundation announced a $1.9 million 
grant to the Santa Clara Family Health Foundation to provide premium support for families 
enrolling their children in Healthy Kids. 
But there was a very important condition attached to the grant: A written 
agreement that the partners in the Children’s Health Initiative would actively 
support and participate in the evaluation process. This was a sine qua non 
for the staff, because without a rigorous evaluation that could stand up to 
scrutiny and potential opposition to the Children’s Health Initiative model, 
there would be no way to leverage the program into broader systems 
change. To underscore the point, Lewit stated it publicly in the Foundation’s 
press release announcing its grant for premium support: “If the Children’s 
Health Initiative is to serve as a model for the rest of the nation, the program 
needs to be carefully evaluated and the results of the evaluation should be 
widely disseminated.”
6The fact that it had committed to funding a rigorous evaluation of the Children’s Health Initiative 
was important to the other California foundations that joined the Packard Foundation in providing 
premium support. Looking back on his foundation’s decision to go forward with its support, Robert 
Ross, MD, president and CEO of The California Endowment, recalls, “Packard’s research played a critical 
role in the confidence we had going into this.” 
By March 2002, just a few months after the Packard Foundation had made its initial grant for premium 
support, the Santa Clara Family Health Foundation received $1 million in additional premium support 
from the California HealthCare Foundation, $950,000 from The California Endowment, and $500,000 
from the San José-based Health Trust. The addition of 
this private funding was enough for the Children’s Health 
Initiative to operate robustly. 
Finding the right evaluator, however, turned out to be 
more challenging than expected. Two prior evaluations 
of children’s coverage programs by California university 
researchers had not been of sufficient quality to be 
useful in moving policy. Nonetheless, the staff invited 
a well-regarded research team at a California university 
to submit an evaluation proposal, believing that an in-
state research team would be more acceptable to the 
community than a group of outsiders. But the proposal 
fell short. 
So the staff turned to Mathematica, a highly respected national evaluation research firm based in 
Princeton, New Jersey. Mathematica’s proposal also was not sufficiently focused, rigorous, and 
methodologically robust to produce the quality of evidence required to move an ambitious policy 
agenda. “I spoke to one of the vice presidents there whom I knew and made it clear that I was very 
disappointed,” Lewit recalls. “And she said, ‘Oh, we have this young guy—Chris Trenholm—who’s 
just starting here. Maybe he can give you what you want.’ So I said, ‘Let me have him.’” The third time 
was indeed a charm: Trenholm—a skilled economist and evaluation researcher who immediately 
understood what the Packard Foundation was looking for—turned out to be an inspired choice.
Also in keeping with the “tipping point” strategy, funding was provided to the Institute for Health Policy 
Solutions to build on the technical assistance it was providing to Santa Clara County and launch the 
Child and Family Technical Assistance Center. Headed by Liane Wong and staffed by a team of seven, 
the Center was designed to help other counties develop their own Children’s Health Initiatives. Over 
time, the Packard Foundation also made grants to other strategically important counties to help with 
the program design, development, and administrative costs of their Children’s Health Initiatives. 
UNDERSTANDING THE RISKS
The pieces were starting to fall into place, but Packard Foundation staff understood that the strategy of 
using evaluation to leverage the impact of the Children’s Health Initiative involved some very real risks. 
For one thing, even if they were ultimately successful, new programs like the Children’s Health Initiative 
generally took several years to work out the kinks and hit their stride. But the staff was gambling that 
in this case, because of the strong commitment of all the key players and because of all the hard work 
that was being done up front, the program would get off to a running start and enroll large numbers 
of children quickly. The staff was also gambling that there would be a substantial multiplier effect that 
would lead to big increases in Medi-Cal and Healthy Families enrollment, which in turn would bring 
The staff was gambling that the 
benefits to the kids themselves, 
including measurable gains in 
their access to health care and 
maybe even their health status, 
would show up quickly .
significant additional state and federal funds into the county—
something that mattered a lot to local health care providers and 
policy makers. And the staff was gambling that the benefits to 
the kids themselves, including measurable gains in their access 
to health care and maybe even their health status, would show 
up quickly.
One big reason that the clock was ticking was that Packard 
Foundation staff, as well as staff at other foundations—most 
notably The California Endowment—believed they had a limited 
window of time for the State of California to pick up the ball on 
children’s coverage before the critical premium support that 
Packard and the other foundations were providing would begin 
to run out.5 In order to persuade 
the State to take this on, enough 
additional counties would have 
to be persuaded to adopt the 
model to create a “tipping point” 
for change. “Looking back on 
this now,” Lewit reflects, “this was 
a really high-risk thing. A lot of 
these things get off the ground 
and it takes a couple of years 
to shake out—and if that had 
happened, it would have been 
a disaster.”
As if these risks weren’t enough, 
there was also a very real 
concern that many of the 
parents of the undocumented children who were being enrolled, 
fearing deportation, would refuse to be interviewed for the 
evaluation—a potentially crippling blow to the credibility of the 
Children’s Health Initiative overall and to the evaluation specifically. 
First, the local partners wanted to know exactly what questions 
would be asked. In response, the Packard Foundation made 
another planning grant to Mathematica for the development of a 
draft questionnaire that was shared with community leaders and 
successfully pretested in the community. Then, to address the fear 
of an unknown entity frightening families with phone calls to ask 
questions about the program, the Santa Clara Family Health Plan 
agreed to make calls to each survey participant to alert them to 
the fact that Mathematica would be contacting them. In addition, 
Linda Baker, together with representatives from PACT and Working 
Partnerships, reached out to the grassroots organizations that 
worked most closely with the county’s undocumented families—
5  The other foundations that were providing substantial premium support to Children’s 
Health Initiatives included The California Endowment, which had announced a five-year $45 
million children’s health insurance initiative; the California HealthCare Foundation; and the Blue 
Shield of California Foundation.
In order to persuade 
the State to offer health 
insurance for all children, 
enough additional 
counties would have to 
be persuaded to adopt 
the model to create a 
“tipping point” for change .
DEALING WITH 
DISAPPOINTING 
FINDINGS
The Packard Foundation’s reliance 
on evaluation to achieve its 
strategic goals in children’s 
coverage could have had a very 
different outcome. In particular, 
there was the possibility that, 
because of unanticipated start-up 
issues, low response rates, or 
other factors, the Santa Clara 
evaluation could have produced 
far less compelling results than 
it did. If this had been the case, 
the Foundation could have 
invested in efforts to improve the 
Santa Clara program* or it could 
have phased out its premium 
support for the Children’s Health 
Initiative and looked for other 
ways to advance its children’s 
coverage agenda. As noted, 
the Foundation’s staff and local 
partners went to great lengths 
to mitigate these potential 
start-up risks. Nonetheless, 
there was the risk that modest 
or negative evaluation findings 
might have undermined the 
work on children’s coverage. 
Foundations that opt to use 
evaluation as a strategic 
intervention should be mindful 
of these risks and be prepared 
to manage them. Foundations 
should also be prepared to openly 
share disappointing findings 
with perhaps even greater 
intentionality, given the need 
for learning and improvement.
* For example, in the late 1990s, 
a number of Packard Foundation- 
supported evaluations of 
different models of home visiting 
programs failed to find evidence 
of effectiveness. The Foundation 
published these results in an 
issue of its journal, The Future 
of Children, and also launched a 
multimillion-dollar grant program 
to help improve the quality of the 
programs it had evaluated. More 
recent evidence suggests that the 
quality of the programs has indeed 
improved.
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8including labor groups, churches, and immigrant services providers—to make sure the message 
was clear that when Mathematica called, it was fine to answer their questions. Finally, because 
some community leaders were still worried that Mathematica was a big national firm with no roots 
in the community, the Foundation asked Dana Hughes, an experienced researcher from the nearby 
University of California at San Francisco, to join the research team and become the “local face” of 
the evaluation.
AN EVALUATION DESIGNED FOR RIGOR AND RELEVANCE
Mathematica’s evaluation of the Children’s Health Initiative had both quantitative and qualitative 
components. The quantitative part was designed to answer two questions: First, what was the program’s 
multiplier effect—that is, how many children eligible for Medi-Cal and Healthy Families were signed 
up as a result of the Children’s Health Initiative? And second, what impact did children’s enrollment in 
Healthy Kids have on their subsequent access to care, their health outcomes, and related outcomes 
like school attendance? The qualitative component provided a detailed description of the Children’s 
Health Initiative, the processes that it used, and the families that it served, including their experiences 
with the program—which turned out to be useful feedback to those running the program.6
The fact that the evaluation focused on these particular questions was by no means accidental. For 
the Foundation’s leveraging strategy to work, it was essential that the evaluation be relevant to the 
policy makers, advocates, and other foundations who would be in a position to act on the findings. 
“We actually started to engage [the key stakeholders] very early in the spring of 2002,” Lewit recalls. “We 
wanted to know what they thought were the important questions, and their top two questions were: 
What is the effect of offering Healthy Kids on enrollment in Healthy Families and Medi-Cal? And what is 
the effect of enrollment in Healthy Kids on children’s access to health care and dental care?”—precisely 
the questions that the evaluation was then designed to answer.7
To ensure that the evaluation would have the necessary rigor to produce credible results, Trenholm 
used a quasi-experimental design in which, to measure the enrollment effects, he compared the 
State’s Medi-Cal and Healthy Families enrollment data for children living in Santa Clara County with 
the same data for children living in 282 matched zip codes across the state. To measure the health care 
effects of Healthy Kids, the health and health care experiences of new enrollees were compared to the 
experiences of children enrolled in the program for one year. As Trenholm sums up the approach that 
he used, “It was a standard Mathematica evaluation of an interesting intervention.” But that was exactly 
what was needed: A well done, rigorous evaluation that would convince even skeptics of the value of 
the Children’s Health Initiative.8
6  Unfortunately, one question that the evaluation was not in a position to answer—because there were no available data on the total number 
of uninsured children living in Santa Clara County—was how close the Children’s Health Initiative actually came to meeting its stated goal of 
covering all of the county’s children.
7  In addition to the rigorous program evaluations designed to move the Foundation’s strategic agenda, the Foundation tracked a variety of 
indicators to measure overall progress toward its goals. These metrics included, for example, the rate of uninsurance for all children and low-
income children in California and the nation, the number of counties with children’s health initiatives, and the number of children enrolled in 
Healthy Kids programs. 
8  More detailed information on the enrollment and health care outcomes methodology can be found at “Impact of the Children’s Health 
Initiative (CHI) of Santa Clara County on Medi-Cal and Healthy Families Enrollment,” Final Report (September 2004); “The Santa Clara County 
Healthy Kids Program: Impacts on Children’s Medi-Cal, Dental, and Vision Care,” Final Report and Appendices  (July 2005); and at “Expanding 
Coverage for Children: The Santa Clara County Children’s Health Initiative,” In Brief #1 (April 2005). All issue briefs and related publications 
from the Santa Clara Children’s Health Initiative evaluation can be found at http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/health/chi.asp.
9Lois Salisbury, who joined the Packard Foundation as Director of the Children, Families and Communities 
Program in March 2002, just as the Children’s Health Initiative strategy was rolling out, recalls 
experiencing “sticker shock” at the price of the evaluation. Nonetheless, she thought, “It was a smart 
bet since the strategy was sound and provided a good opportunity to leverage a local commitment 
into state and/or national policy change.”
OVERWHELMING EFFECTS
While the evaluation design may have been “standard,” the 
findings were anything but. Early results showed that in its 
first two years of operation, the Children’s Health Initiative had 
enrolled almost as many additional children in Medi-Cal and 
Healthy Families (13,455) as it had enrolled in Healthy Kids (15,638). 
This meant that, in addition to enrolling more than 29,000 Santa 
Clara County children who would otherwise be uninsured, the 
Children’s Health Initiative had yielded a substantial financial 
benefit to the county. In its report of these findings, Mathematica 
put a dollar figure on this financial benefit: “As a result of the gains 
in Medi-Cal and Healthy Families enrollment, [the Children’s 
Health Initiative] increased state and federal spending in Santa 
Clara County for these two programs by an estimated $24.4 million during the initiative’s first two 
years.” This was roughly three times the $8 million that the city and county together had invested in the 
Children’s Health Initiative during those two years.
Early findings also indicated that access to medical and dental care 
had improved dramatically for those children who were enrolled 
in Healthy Kids. For instance, the proportion of children with 
a usual source of primary care rose from 49 percent to 89 
percent, while the proportion of children with a usual source 
of dental care jumped from 30 percent to 81 percent. Looking 
back, Trenholm is still amazed at the magnitude of the 
program’s impact. “The effects of Healthy Kids coverage were 
overwhelming,” he says. “Some people were concerned that 
we wouldn’t find any effects because the county was so good 
at serving undocumented children, but we had evidence of 
three, four, five times more kids going to the dentist the first 
year of the program to have teeth pulled and cavities filled.” As 
Liane Wong, who spoke to county leaders across the state about the 
findings, recalls, “The data brought into sharp focus the health needs 
of this largely invisible population of kids.”
Importantly, Mathematica did not simply release the evaluation findings “cold.” Just as Trenholm and 
the Packard Foundation staff had asked some of the key stakeholders on the front end what they 
wanted to know from the evaluation, they now shared the preliminary results with many of the same 
key stakeholders—both locally and in Sacramento—before making them public. They took this step 
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for two reasons: First, to ensure that there would be “no surprises” and, second, to seek input and 
guidance on how to present the findings so that they would be most useful to policy makers and 
advocates. Wendy Lazarus, a prominent children’s advocate whose organization participated in the 
state policy group, was impressed. “Packard asked the advocates to help them frame the Santa Clara 
findings,” she says. “This was truly refreshing, and it was a very important step.” In Santa Clara County, the 
response was equally enthusiastic. “We presented the first round of Healthy Kids results to a meeting 
of local stakeholders,” Linda Baker remembers, “and they were thrilled.”9
SPREADING THE WORD
In keeping with its strategy of evaluating a successful program and then aggressively getting the word 
out, the Packard Foundation did not leave the dissemination of the evaluation findings to chance. The 
Foundation engaged a Bay Area communications firm to help spread the word. A local newspaper, the 
San José Mercury News, championed the program, and the positive findings about the program also 
appeared in other Bay Area newspapers. Short, non-technical trifold briefs identified with a unique logo 
were used to disseminate the evaluation results, and both Mathematica and the Institute for Health 
Policy Solutions launched landing pages where all the evaluation reports could be easily accessed 
online. And Lewit, Linda Baker, and Liane Wong began presenting the findings to interested parties up 
and down the state, often with Chris Trenholm and his PowerPoint slides in tow. 
Lewit remembers that one such presentation in particular had a big impact. “Liane and I were invited 
to a statewide meeting in Sacramento of county First 5 commissioners. We shared a brief slide show 
showing the commissioners Santa Clara’s increasing enrollment and some key points on the impact 
of the Children’s Health Initiative. Then we left and did other 
business in Sacramento. When we returned at the end of the day, 
every county but one wanted to have one.” 
And indeed, despite the fact that its funding could only be used 
for children through age 5, the local First 5 commissions were an 
important source of premium support for new Children’s Health 
Initiatives in counties across the state. As Linda Baker recalls, 
“First 5 funding was critical in both San Mateo and Santa Cruz, 
which were the second and third counties to launch Children’s 
Health Initiatives. And First 5 California’s matching program, 
which required the county commissions to adopt basically 
identical programs, was important to encouraging the counties 
to remain similar enough that they could be rolled up into one 
state program in the end.” In addition, in two counties—Los 
Angeles and San Mateo—the First 5 commissions funded the Urban Institute to conduct evaluations 
of the impact of their Children’s Health Initiatives on children through age 5. Mathematica participated 
as a subcontractor on those evaluations, which built on its evaluation of the Santa Clara Children’s 
Health Initiative. Ian Hill of the Urban Institute, who was the principal investigator on the Los Angeles 
9 It wasn’t until several years later that Mathematica released its findings on health outcomes and school attendance—which showed that 
children enrolled in Healthy Kids for at least a year experienced improved health status and fewer activity limitations and were less likely to miss 
more than three school days in the past month (“The Effect of New Insurance Coverage on the Health Status of Low-Income Children in 
Santa Clara County,” Health Services Research, April 2007). The delay resulted from the researchers’ initial concerns that these positive effects of 
Healthy Kids on the children’s health status seemed too good to be true. An earlier study showing substantial health benefits associated with the 
Healthy Families Program had been criticized on methodological grounds, so the researchers proceeded cautiously before releasing the Santa 
Clara findings.
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evaluation, recalls, “The choice of an evaluator for the Los Angeles Children’s Health Initiative was 
competitive, and working with Mathematica was important to our winning the contract. In addition, 
it provided a unique opportunity to combine the consistent findings from the three evaluations for 
greater impact.” 10
PURSUING BIGGER GAME
Almost from the beginning, the Packard Foundation, The California Endowment, and other funders 
active in the field were hoping that California would adopt the Children’s Health Initiative model as 
the basis for a new statewide children’s health insurance program—and here, too, Mathematica’s 
Santa Clara findings proved to be useful. Peter Long, who at that time led The California Endowment’s 
children’s coverage program and is now president and CEO of the Blue Shield of California Foundation, 
remembers, “We wanted to go statewide, and we used the Santa Clara evaluation [to help make the 
case].”
The Santa Clara findings were also helpful to advocates in making 
the case for a statewide program. “The Santa Clara findings were as 
policy-relevant and as useful as any I’ve ever worked with,” children’s 
advocate Wendy Lazarus recalls. “There was a push to get statewide 
coverage for all kids, which made it through the legislative process, 
and one of our main messages was the all-kids message: That if 
you have a no-wrong-door policy, it also brings in the eligible but 
unenrolled kids. The school attendance data was another big selling 
point.”
And indeed, a bill for statewide children’s coverage that was modeled on the Santa Clara Children’s 
Health Initiative was passed by both houses of the California legislature in 2005. But because there 
was no funding attached to the bill, the governor vetoed it, citing the state’s massive budget deficit. 
Looking back, Liane Wong recalls that there was a lack of political will to secure the necessary financing, 
stemming in part from residual politics around immigration—and many of the children who would 
have been covered by such a program were undocumented. In addition, some counties that already 
had a Children’s Health Initiative had mixed views about having their programs subsumed by the 
state—partly because of local pride and partly because they were nervous about state intervention. 
Gene Lewit believes that in a way, the “tipping point” strategy was a victim of its own success. So much 
funding had come in from foundations and other sources to support the county Children’s Health 
Initiatives that by 2005, “there were no more hungry counties”—and so, he says, “the strategy was 
weakened.”
Two subsequent developments could potentially have resulted in statewide children’s coverage. The 
first was a ballot initiative in 2006 (Proposition 86) that would have sharply raised the state’s tobacco 
tax, with the proceeds to be used to increase hospital reimbursements and expand children’s coverage. 
And the second was an ambitious push by Governor Schwarzenegger in 2007 to enact universal 
coverage in California, which would have included coverage of all of California’s children. But the ballot 
initiative was narrowly defeated at the polls, while the governor’s initiative quietly died in committee 
in early 2008. 
10  Two issue briefs were published demonstrating the consistency of favorable outcomes from evaluations of the Children’s Health Initiative in 
the three counties: “Three Independent Evaluations of Healthy Kids Programs Find Substantial Gains in Children’s Dental Health Care,” In 
Brief #2 (September 2008) and “Three Independent Evaluations of Healthy Kids Programs Find Dramatic Gains in Well-Being of Children 
and Families,” In Brief #1 (November 2007).
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THE DREAM LIVES ON
Despite these setbacks at the state level, by 2008 Children’s Health Initiatives had been established in 
30 of California’s 58 counties, and those 30 counties accounted for well over half the state’s children. 
By this time, the Packard Foundation had committed a total of $9.9 million in premium support for the 
Santa Clara Healthy Kids program, along with a total of $1.8 million for Mathematica’s evaluation of the 
Santa Clara Children’s Health Initiative; $3.5 million to the Institute for Health Policy Solutions for the 
Child and Family Technical Assistance Center; and $3 million to seven counties other than Santa Clara 
for development and administrative support of their Children’s Health Initiatives. But soon afterward, 
the premium support that major foundations (including the Packard Foundation) had been providing 
to the county Children’s Health Initiatives began winding down, forcing many programs to scale back. 
Nevertheless, a number of First 5 commissions, as well as local funders and local governments, have 
continued to provide premium support; as of June 30, 2013, there were 22 Children’s Health Initiatives 
still operating across the state, including nine active Healthy Kids programs—and including the original 
flagship program in Santa Clara County, as well as those in nearby San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa 
Cruz counties. 
Kathleen King, the current CEO of the Healthier Kids Foundation of Santa Clara County (formerly the 
Santa Clara Family Health Foundation), still uses the Mathematica findings in her fundraising efforts 
for the program almost 10 years after they were first released. In fact, she says, she used those same 
evaluation findings to help make the case for a sales tax increase that was passed by Santa Clara 
County voters in November 2012. In October 2013, the board of supervisors voted to use a share of the 
proceeds from this sales tax increase to fund an expansion of Santa Clara’s Children’s Health Initiative so 
that it will cover all children through age 18 with family incomes up to four times the Federal Poverty 
Level for the next 10 years—an income level even higher than originally envisioned by Bob Brownstein 
and his partners at the program’s inception!11 
In addition, Lois Salisbury points out that there were critical lessons learned in Santa Clara about 
enrollment (“you all come/no wrong door”) and coverage for immigrant children which have been 
applied in other places and remain important today.
11  As a small intermediate step toward a statewide program to cover all children, California amended its CHIP program to allow counties to use 
local funds to attract federal CHIP funds in support of coverage for children in county Healthy Kids programs from families with incomes too high 
to qualify for Healthy Families but who otherwise met federal CHIP requirements. Santa Clara and two other Bay Area counties are still using this 
option to help fund their Healthy Kids programs. 
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PART II: 
Getting to the Finish Line
A new grantmaking strategy to build momentum for a program 
to insure all children in the United States was built off lessons 
learned in California about using evaluation strategically and a 
new communications initiative developed to address the slowing 
of progress on children’s coverage nationally . 
2005
•	 Progress on children’s 
coverage nationally 
decelerates noticeably
•	 Packard Foundation 
engages Spitfire Strategies 
to help change public 
discussion on children’s 
coverage programs to a 
more positive message
2006
•	 Packard funds children’s advocacy 
organizations in nine states to test the 
Narrative Communications Project; 
advocates report “message echo”
•	 External review of the Packard 
Foundation’s children’s coverage work 
praises CHI strategy and suggests using 
similar strategy in an increased focus at 
state and national levels
2007
•	 Packard Foundation 
Board approves Insuring 
America’s Children 
(IAC) strategy to 
create momentum for 
nationwide coverage of 
all children
•	 Following the veto of 
CHIP reauthorization 
by President Bush, 
Packard grantees label 
CHIP reauthorization as 
“unfinished business” to 
prioritize issue for next 
administration2010
•	 President Obama signs Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act into law 
•	 Mathematica evaluation describes 
successful IAC advocacy strategies
•	 Advocates and stakeholders from all states 
convened in person to network and share 
successful strategies
•	 Grantmakers In Health helps share 
evaluation findings with funders across 
the country
2009
•	 Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization 
Act (CHIPRA) signed into law
•	 Stock market downturn forces funding cutback for 
Packard Foundation work on children’s coverage 
•	 IAC evaluation restructured to focus on identifying 
successful advocacy strategies
•	 CHI strategy begins phase-out
2008
•	 Packard Foundation 
awards IAC Finish Line 
grants to advocacy 
organizations in  
seven states
•	 The Packard Foundation 
funds Mathematica for 
IAC evaluation work
2012
•	 Mathematica reports 
additional lessons 
learned from the IAC  
and Narrative strategies
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CHANGING THE NARRATIVE
In 2005, even before Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed the bill that would have made the Children’s 
Health Initiative a statewide program in California, the Packard Foundation staff was becoming 
concerned that progress in expanding children’s coverage had stalled at the national level.12 Children’s 
advocates in many states were running into political and fiscal headwinds, and there was a growing fear 
that Medicaid would be converted into a block grant program—which could have meant significant 
funding cuts and the loss of Medicaid’s status as an entitlement program.
And so in the fall of 2005, Gene Lewit held a meeting of the Packard Foundation’s national grantees 
who were working on children’s coverage issues and asked Kristen Grimm, founder and president 
of Spitfire Strategies, a Washington, D.C.-based communications firm, to facilitate the meeting. The 
purpose of the meeting was to elicit ideas about how to get things back on track, but according to 
Lewit, “No new ideas emerged from the meeting.”
But Kristen Grimm did have a new idea: Reframe the 
advocacy message from the prevailing negative mantra 
about how many children were uninsured and how many 
would be hurt if funding were cut to a positive message 
that defined the expansions in children’s coverage as a rare 
bipartisan “win” that has already yielded great benefits to 
states and to working families.
Intrigued, Lewit decided it was worth a try, so the 
Packard Foundation funded Grimm’s firm to develop the 
idea. The result was a new initiative called the Narrative 
Communications Project, which was based on the notion that there was a positive narrative about 
children’s coverage that needed to be shared, but that different states were at different stages and 
therefore needed to focus on different “chapters” of the narrative. In early 2006, through a grant to the 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the Packard Foundation provided modest funding to children’s 
advocacy organizations in nine states to pilot-test this concept.13
Once again, the evaluation findings from the Santa Clara Children’s Health Initiative proved useful—
this time in states outside California. Ed Walz, who was at Spitfire Strategies at the time and worked 
closely with the state advocates, recalls, “The Santa Clara evaluation was helpful in the early part of 
the Narrative Project. We needed to go from the prevailing negative narrative to a positive one, and 
the Santa Clara evaluation gave us positive findings we could point to.” The advocates themselves 
also found it helpful. According to John Bouman, a Chicago-based advocate, “It was useful to show 
politicians that it had been done somewhere else and that it worked.”
12  In addition to the Santa Clara evaluation, the Foundation used a number of indicators to measure progress on its children’s coverage work 
(see note 8 above). One metric was the percent of uninsured children in the U.S. as measured by the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). 
Although the official uninsured rate is measured using data from the Current Population Survey, that survey lagged changes in the uninsured rate 
by more than a year. The NHIS data was released quarterly with a much shorter lag and therefore was a better indicator of changes in trends. The 
NHIS data signaled that, after declining steadily for years, the uninsured rate was plateauing. This was taken as a signal that a course adjustment 
in the children’s coverage work might be needed.
13  A smaller amount of funding for the pilot was provided by First Focus, a national children’s advocacy organization that the Packard Foundation 
had helped establish several years earlier. First Focus was interested in testing the Narrative messages for possible use in its advocacy activities. 
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Before long, a number of the advocates reported that they were getting 
“message echo” from policy makers and in the media—an encouraging 
sign that the narrative strategy was working. Message echo occurred 
when influential people began repeating the same positive messages 
that the advocates were using in their communications as part of the 
Narrative Project. “That was a very quick and very strong metric,” Lewit 
says. “We saw changes in some of the states pretty quickly—including a 
big change in Texas, where the situation turned around in about a year.”
INSURING AMERICA’S CHILDREN: THE NEXT STEP
At about the same time that it launched the Narrative Project with 
Spitfire Strategies, the Packard Foundation engaged the management 
consulting firm McKinsey & Co. to conduct a five-year review of its work 
on children’s coverage. In their report, the McKinsey consultants expressed their admiration for the 
fact that the Foundation had leveraged $25 from other funders for every dollar that it had invested 
in its work on the Santa Clara Children’s Health Initiative—a phenomenal leveraging ratio, in their 
experience. Drawing on input from staff, the report concluded by recommending that, going forward, 
the Foundation scale back some of its less successful investments in improving California’s enrollment 
systems and instead ramp up its funding for work in other states and at the national level.
As he started thinking about what a national strategy might look like, Lewit reflected on some of the 
lessons from his experience with the Children’s Health Initiative strategy in California. Two main lessons 
jumped out: 
•	 A rigorously evaluated model, together with aggressive communications, networking, and 
technical assistance, could help to create a critical mass of support to change public policy on 
a broader scale.
•	 A well-funded, focused advocacy strategy was critical for bringing about change. 
In his view, this second condition had not been met in California. While the California advocates had 
been well funded by The California Endowment, the Packard Foundation, and others, Lewit believed 
that they were not a cohesive group. Some focused on the immediate need to sustain funding for their 
local Children’s Health Initiatives while others wanted to address a variety of children’s issues, resulting 
in a fatal loss of focus at the state level. The governor’s effort to cover all Californians also undermined 
the advocacy focus on insuring all children. 
These two fundamental insights were at the heart of an extraordinarily ambitious new multistate, 
multiyear national initiative that the staff presented—and the Packard Foundation Board approved—
in March 2007. Titled “Insuring America’s Children: States Leading the Way,” the initiative included three 
components: 
1 “Finish Line” grants, budgeted at $250,000 a year for three years, to advocacy organizations in 
states positioned to make significant advances in children’s coverage were designed to build on 
the momentum created by the Narrative Project. Extensive technical assistance and networking 
support for state grantees would be provided by the Center for Children and Families at 
Georgetown University’s Health Policy Institute, led at the time by Cindy Mann, who partnered 
in developing the networking advocacy strategy. Spitfire Strategies would continue to provide 
vital communications support.
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2 Technical assistance and networking support for state policy makers and administrators 
responsible for children’s coverage would be provided by the National Academy for State 
Health Policy.
3 A multiyear evaluation project would be carried out by Mathematica.
As Lewit explains, “The intent was to create momentum across the entire country for a program to 
cover all kids. This strategy built off the ‘tipping point’ idea in our California Children’s Health Initiative 
strategy, but it was more sophisticated: It was explicit, all our partners bought in, and we had strong 
leadership and solid communications.” Lois Salisbury, herself a veteran health care and children’s 
advocate, agrees. She notes that there were several key components 
to the Insuring America’s Children strategy which created a powerful 
dynamic: Strong communications undergirded by technical and 
financial support for state-based advocates, seasoned state and 
national leaders, and a motivated peer learning community. Without 
those components, Salisbury thinks that the evaluation results might 
have been ignored.
Liane Wong points out that although Insuring America’s Children 
was a new strategy, in some states it built on earlier investments in all 
fifty states by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation through its large 
“Covering Kids” and “Covering Kids and Families” programs, which 
were both aimed at increasing enrollment in SCHIP and Medicaid. Moreover, at the same time that the 
Packard Foundation was launching Insuring America’s Children, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
was launching yet another national initiative to expand access to care, called “Consumer Voices for 
Coverage”—and in fact, to underscore their shared commitment to improving access to care, the two 
initiatives were announced jointly by the two foundations. 
THE BEST-LAID PLANS
As in California, the evaluation was to play a pivotal role in Insuring America’s Children. Accordingly, 
Lewit had asked Chris Trenholm to lead it and had written it into the budget at a million dollars a year. 
“The evaluation was supposed to do the same kinds of things in the space we were working that we 
had done in Santa Clara,” Lewit recalls, “the difference being that we would choose among the states 
to evaluate those kinds of changes in program structure or whatever else that we thought would help 
to move the story forward.” To Trenholm, it really did look like it would be Santa Clara redux: “The point 
was to find a state success story, assess the impact, and then share it nationally.” Lewit and Trenholm 
even convened a group of policy experts and advocates in late 2007 to explain the initiative to them 
and to help formulate the key policy questions the evaluation should try to answer—just as they had 
in Santa Clara County and Sacramento for the Santa Clara evaluation.
Then suddenly, in September 2008, shortly after the first $1 million grant for the evaluation had been 
issued to Mathematica, the bottom dropped out of the stock market and the Packard Foundation’s 
assets—like those of most foundations—took a major hit. This was actually the second plunge in 
the Foundation’s assets in less than a decade; the first had occurred in 2001–2002 when the dot-
com bubble burst. In that case, the budget for the Children’s Health Initiative strategy—including the 
evaluation—had come away relatively unscathed. But not this time. 
In early 2009, the Foundation scaled back its investment in children’s coverage and the evaluation 
plan for Insuring America’s Children had to be completely rethought. Lewit remembers the moment 
well. “I called up Chris and I said, ‘We’re not going to be able to do what we thought we were going to 
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do. We’ll have to figure out how to make the best use of the money that we already have, because it 
doesn’t look like we’re going to have much more.” In fact, it soon became clear that there would be no 
additional money for the evaluation beyond an earlier $250,000 planning grant and the $1 million that 
Mathematica had been awarded just before the crash.
Before the collapse of the stock market, Lewit, Trenholm, and Liane Wong 
had already decided that the evaluation of Insuring America’s Children 
should include an initial round of site visits to each participating state 
in order to get the lay of the land and to interview the advocates and 
other key players. Only now, what had initially been intended as a 
relatively modest descriptive component of a much bigger and largely 
quantitative evaluation suddenly became its centerpiece. Wong, who 
had joined the Packard Foundation in late 2006 and was responsible 
for managing the state grantmaking under Insuring America’s Children, 
remembers, “There was some discussion about evaluating a model state 
like Washington, but then after the market collapsed we didn’t have the 
same level of funding, so we decided to evaluate the program by tracking 
changes in state policies and enrollment data and understanding the role 
that the advocates were playing. It was intended to help the field—state 
advocates and policy makers—including those in states where Packard was not active. And also key 
stakeholders at the federal level—it was important for them to know that there was all this momentum 
and energy in the states.”
Making sure that federal officials knew about the momentum around children’s coverage at the state 
level was central to the Foundation’s momentum-building strategy, as was the decision to actively 
share the lessons and insights from the funded states with advocates and policy makers in states that 
were not being funded by the Packard Foundation.
Meanwhile, however, the stock market collapse had dealt two additional blows to the strategy. 
First, like the evaluation budget, the Packard Foundation’s grants to the state advocacy 
organizations wound up being smaller than originally planned, and the average grant 
size declined steadily over the years of the initiative (although several states were 
added to the program). Second, what had already been an uphill battle in many 
states suddenly had to be fought on an even steeper slope. “The message that 
all kids should have coverage never changed,” Trenholm remembers, “but 
what the advocates did was much more defensive… At the ground level 
and in the statehouse, the advocates were just trying to see to it that the 
gains they’d made were preserved.”
LEVERAGING THE FINDINGS
Remarkably, despite reduced budgets and the harsh fiscal climate as the stock 
market crash turned into the steepest economic downturn since the Great 
Depression, the first evaluation brief published by Mathematica—based on state 
enrollment data and site visits to six of the eight Finish Line states—reported that “all six 
Finish Line states had made tangible progress in covering children.”  The brief clearly described 
what the grantees had done and the conditions they were up against, as well as the specific policy 
The first evaluation 
brief published by 
Mathematica reported 
that “all six Finish 
Line states had made 
tangible progress in 
covering children .”
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gains that had been achieved. The brief also documented the specific strategies that the advocates 
said had been most effective, and identified seven “lessons learned.” A companion brief published at 
the same time emphasized the importance of understanding each state’s unique policy environment 
and developing strong relationships with policy makers.14
This kind of qualitative information was clearly very different from the kinds of “hard” quantitative 
outcomes produced by the Santa Clara evaluation—outcomes like the size and financial value of the 
“multiplier,” the impact on children’s access to medical and dental care, and the impact on their health 
and school attendance (although, as noted, the Santa Clara evaluation had also produced qualitative 
findings). 
But many of the advocates found it very helpful. As John 
Bouman of Chicago noted, “One of the things about the 
Packard evaluation [of Insuring America’s Children] that’s 
pretty unique is the examination of advocacy strategies: How 
do you move from a good idea to law? This was really useful 
stuff.” And Jon Gould, a Seattle-based advocate, commented, 
“The Insuring America’s Children evaluation was very 
significant for us. It was an evaluation of advocacy strategies 
and tactics, as well as whether we were meeting our metrics 
on enrollment. It allowed us to reflect on our own work in 
the middle of the campaign rather than at the end. And 
the findings from the other states were extremely helpful. 
For example, we learned a lot from Illinois about [covering] 
undocumented children.”
In keeping with its intent of creating momentum across the entire country, the Packard Foundation 
did not limit the audience for these evaluation findings to its own grantees. As was done in Santa Clara, 
evaluation findings were previewed with grantees so that there would be no surprises and potential 
errors would be caught and corrected, and so that the grantees’ input on framing and audiences would 
be incorporated into the dissemination work. Also, as was done with the Santa Clara evaluation, a logo, 
a distinctive look, and a dedicated Mathematica landing page were created for the Insuring America’s 
Children evaluation briefs (which were longer and more detailed than the Santa Clara briefs)15. In 
keeping with the times, the dissemination strategy focused on use of electronic media. Lewit and 
Wong posted blogs about the evaluation findings on the Say Ahhh! website which Georgetown’s 
Center for Children and Families had created to support the work of state-based advocates and others 
working to advance children’s coverage,16 and grantees were trained to spread the word about the 
evaluation results through social media such as Facebook and Twitter. 
In addition, working closely with the Georgetown Center for Children and Families, the Foundation 
set about trying to create a national network of children’s advocates from both funded and unfunded 
states—and that network became another prime audience for the evaluation findings. “We were 
trying to create this network,” Lewit recalls, “and that, I think, was a really successful effort. With 
Georgetown taking the lead, there were three-day meetings in four different regions of the country, 
and representatives from every state attended to talk about the work they were doing on kids’ coverage. 
14  See “Strategic Engagement of Policymakers Is Key to Advancing a Children’s Health Care Coverage Policy Agenda. Evaluation 
Brief 2” (July 2010) and “State-Based Advocacy as a Tool for Expanding Children’s Coverage: Lessons from Site Visits to Six IAC Grantee 
States. Evaluation Brief 1” (July 2010).
15  All Insuring America’s Children briefs can be found at http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/health/iac.asp.
16  Links to the blogs about the findings from the IAC evaluation can be found in Appendix 2.
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From that point on, Georgetown started doing what they called 
‘partner calls’—technical assistance conference calls which were 
open to both Insuring America’s Children grantees and advocates 
from states not funded by the Packard Foundation. The evaluation 
case studies were definitely used to inform that process, but they 
were also used to build up demand for [Georgetown’s partner calls 
and individualized technical assistance].”
The third key audience for the findings from the Insuring America’s 
Children evaluation was other funders, especially other foundations. 
The Santa Clara evaluation had been invaluable in persuading other 
funders to support the Children’s Health Initiative strategy in California, and the Insuring America’s 
Children grantees were telling the Packard Foundation staff that one of the most important ways they 
used the evaluation findings was in their local fundraising efforts. 
Accordingly, Foundation staff worked with Grantmakers In Health, a national organization of hundreds 
of foundations active in the health field, to create a national network of funders interested in children’s 
coverage. “We used the evaluation briefs and reports to encourage participants in the network to 
fund these kinds of things in their states, even if they weren’t going to fund our grantees or in states 
where we were funding,” Lewit recalls. According to Osula Rushing, a vice president at Grantmakers In 
Health who worked with this funders network, “One of the strategies was to expose the foundations to 
Packard’s national grantees—including Georgetown and Mathematica—and there was a lot of interest 
in the evaluation work, because other funders weren’t funding those kinds of evaluations.” 
Chris Trenholm, who made multiple presentations of the findings from the Insuring America’s Children 
evaluation at Grantmakers In Health, agrees, and is impressed by the impact that the evaluation 
appears to have had on funders: “I was talking to Liane [Wong] the last time I was at the Packard 
Foundation, and a lot of foundations have bought in. In Colorado and Texas in particular, but they’ve 
got funding partners in pretty much all the states. I think it’s pretty amazing, actually, how many state-
based foundations are now funding advocacy around coverage.”
THE ATTRIBUTION QUESTION
In a report to the Packard Foundation Board in early 2013, Trenholm noted that since the Packard 
Foundation launched its children’s coverage strategy in Santa Clara County in 2001, the percentage of 
uninsured children in the United States “has fallen precipitously, from 11 percent in 2001 to 6.7 percent 
in 2012,” and he pointed out that the growth in children’s coverage had occurred entirely through 
those public programs that had been the focus of the Packard Foundation strategy.
As for Gene Lewit, he believes that, because of the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA), the five-year goal of the Insuring America’s Children strategy—a national program to 
cover all children—has been achieved, but much work remains to be done to assure that the ACA is 
implemented effectively and that the gains in children’s coverage are not undermined in the process.
How much—if any—of that “win” can be attributed to the Packard Foundation’s strategy remains 
an open question. The reality is that because of the complexity of the policy process and the large 
number of players and multiplicity of factors that influence the outcome, such questions of attribution 
are often unanswerable. But as Carol Larson, the Packard Foundation’s president and CEO, makes clear, 
the story doesn’t end here. “The Finish Line evaluation and grants,” she says, “will be helpful to us as we 
move into implementation of the Affordable Care Act.” 
There was a lot of interest 
in the evaluation work, 
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PART III:
Lessons Learned 
Evaluation enabled the Packard Foundation to expand the impact of its 
work to grow children’s health insurance coverage . Analysis of the Packard 
experience yields five valuable lessons about using evaluation as a strategic 
program tool:
1 Use evaluation to expand impact
2 Engage key audiences early and often
3 Frame and deliver the message
4 Stay flexible
5 Staff up
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The Packard Foundation’s experience with the use of evaluation in its children’s coverage strategy—
both in Santa Clara County and nationally—yields some useful insights and lessons for funders and 
others who want to maximize the impact of their program investments:
1 Use evaluation to expand impact: Beyond its obvious value for internal learning and program 
performance, high-quality program evaluation—coupled with sophisticated communications 
and accessible expertise and technical assistance—can be a powerful strategic intervention in its 
own right to promote innovation, leverage additional resources, and foster large-scale policy and 
systems change. 
The Santa Clara evaluation: 
•	 Was used to promote the replication of the Children’s Health Initiative model in  
more than half the counties in California, which together contained well over half of 
California’s children.
•	 Helped to leverage hundreds of millions of additional public and private dollars 
for children’s coverage, including county, city, state, federal, First 5, and foundation 
funding, and including continued renewal funding for many of the Children’s  
Health Initiatives.
•	 Informed and helped make the case for state legislation that was passed by the legislature 
and would have established and provided funding for a statewide program to cover all 
children based on the Children’s Health Initiative model.
•	 Has been used by advocates in other states to make the case for expanding  
children’s coverage. 
The innovative focus on identifying effective advocacy strategies in the Insuring America’s 
Children evaluation: 
•	 Provided valuable strategic and tactical insights to advocates and policy makers in states 
across the country, both within and outside the program.
•	 Helped to engage many additional funders—including national, state, and regional 
foundations—in efforts to expand children’s coverage.
2 Engage key audiences early and often: To maximize its impact on the policy process, 
the focus of the evaluation must be informed from the outset by the interests and concerns 
of the principal stakeholders, and the findings should be shared in advance with those 
same stakeholders. 
This proved to be very helpful in California, where the Packard Foundation created policy advisory 
boards of key stakeholders both in Santa Clara County and at the state level to elicit input in 
determining the focus of the evaluation, framing the findings, and helping to disseminate 
the results. The same practice of soliciting stakeholder input and previewing findings with 
stakeholders was also used in the evaluation of Insuring America’s Children.
3 Frame and deliver the message: To maximize the impact of a strategic evaluation, the findings 
must be framed to maximize their relevance to the policy process and effectively delivered in real time 
to strategically important audiences so that they can quickly be put to use. 
In the case of the Santa Clara evaluation, this meant in-person meetings with officials in Santa 
Clara County and with county officials around the state who were interested in starting their 
own Children’s Health Initiatives, as well as briefings for the California legislature and department 
heads. In the case of Insuring America’s Children, it involved creating a network of funders 
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who could support the children’s coverage agenda in their own states, as well as a network of 
advocates in all states. It also involved keeping the evaluation reports short and accessible to 
nontechnical audiences—and, in the case of Insuring America’s Children, using emerging forms 
of electronic communication to spread information quickly and economically. 
4 Stay flexible: While rigorous quantitative findings usually have the greatest traction with policy 
makers and the public, less costly qualitative evaluations can also be of great value to advocates, 
funders, and others seeking effective ways to bring about change. 
Despite initial plans to fund another high-cost quantitative evaluation comparable to the Santa 
Clara study, Mathematica’s scaled-back descriptive case study findings proved to be of real value 
to both advocates and funders. And in combination with Georgetown’s inclusive networking 
and its technical assistance to states outside the program, the qualitative evaluation of Insuring 
America’s Children helped to stimulate continued progress on children’s coverage in states 
across the country.
5 Staff up: Effectively using evaluation as a strategic intervention is highly labor-intensive and may 
require greater staffing capacity than many funders currently devote to evaluation. This staff should 
include trained research professionals with a thorough grasp of the design, implementation, and 
strategic application of program evaluations. 
Since the beginning of the Children’s Health Initiative and continuing on through Insuring 
America’s Children, Linda Baker, Liane Wong, and Gene Lewit made extraordinary investments of 
time and effort in the many activities required to ensure the success of the Packard Foundation’s 
evaluation strategy—everything from getting the necessary buy-in from all key stakeholders 
and community groups on the front end to getting the word out to all the key audiences on the 
back end—and most of that work could not have been farmed out to the external evaluator or to 
other grantees. At the same time, it is clear that without the staff’s sophisticated understanding 
of the potential value of evaluation as a strategic intervention, and their ability to conceptualize 
and manage the evaluation grants and the roll-out of the findings, the success and impact of 
the Packard Foundation’s evaluations of its two major children’s coverage initiatives would not 
have been possible. 
While this report explores the Packard Foundation’s experience combining program evaluation 
with effective stakeholder engagement and strategic communications in its work on children’s 
health insurance, the Packard Foundation and its staff also use evaluation and monitoring as tools 
for identifying what is and isn’t working and use that knowledge for program improvement, as the 
Foundation did in the case of home visiting in 1999, and to make course corrections, as it did with the 
Narrative Communications Project in 2006.
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CLOSING REFLECTIONS
The Packard Foundation is not alone in its use of evaluation to leverage the impact of its programs. 
However, its approach to evaluation in its children’s coverage work had several distinguishing features. 
First, evaluation was essential to the Foundation’s larger change strategy. Without an independent 
evaluation to leverage its impact, the staff would not have recommended going forward with 
premium support for the Santa Clara Children’s Health Initiative. Second, evaluation was embedded in 
a broader change strategy that included active dissemination, technical assistance, advocacy support, 
and collaboration with other funders. This strategy relied on a highly skilled and credible evaluator as 
well as substantial investments in strategic communication, networking, and high-quality technical 
assistance in order to ensure that:
•	 The evaluation findings reached the intended audiences.
•	 Those audiences would have ready access to the necessary expertise to act on those findings 
in their own community or state. 
Also, the Foundation’s willingness to stay the course following the sharp downturn in technology stocks 
in 2001—and the staff’s ability to make a major course correction in its evaluation plans following the 
collapse of the stock market in 2008—highlights how critical it is to remain focused on the goal but 
flexible in its execution.
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Joan Alker, Executive Director, Center for Children and Families, Georgetown University Health  
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Linda Schuurmann Baker, Program Officer, The David and Lucile Packard Foundation
John Bouman, President, Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law
Bob Brownstein, Director of Policy and Research, Working Partnerships USA
Elizabeth Burke Bryant, Executive Director, Rhode Island Kids Count
Leona Butler, CEO Emeritus, Santa Clara Family Health Plan 
Kimberley Chin, Programme Executive, Atlantic Philanthropies
Karen Crompton, President and CEO, Voices for Utah Children
Jon Gould, Deputy Director, Children’s Alliance
Kristen Grimm, President, Spitfire Strategies
Matt Hammer, Executive Director, Innovative Public Schools, former Executive Director, PACT
Anna Hasselblad, Communications and Operations Manager, California Coverage and  
Health Initiatives
Ian Hill, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute
Andrew Hyman, Senior Program Officer, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Kathleen King, CEO, Healthier Kids Foundation Santa Clara County
Carol Larson, President and CEO, The David and Lucile Packard Foundation
Wendy Lazarus, Founder and Co-President, Children’s Partnership
Peter Long, President and CEO, Blue Shield of California Foundation
Robert Ross, President and CEO, California Endowment
Osula Rushing, Vice President, Grantmakers In Health
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APPENDIX 2: EVALUATION BRIEFS AND BLOGS
Santa Clara evaluation materials can be found at  
http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/health/chi.asp
IAC evaluation materials can be found at  
http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/health/iac.asp
Say Ahhh! blog posts about findings from the IAC evaluation can be found at:
•	 Children’s Health Coverage Gains in the States Boosted by Innovative 
Communications Campaign
•	 Getting to the Finish Line: Investments in State-Based Advocacy Show Real 
Returns in Covering Uninsured Children
•	 Packard Releases New Report on Impact of Children’s Health Care Advocacy
•	 Advocates Can Guide and Support Efforts to Advance Children’s Coverage: 
Reports Show How
